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Hardy’s non-locality paradox is a proof without inequalities showing that certain non-local cor-
relations violate local realism. It is ‘possibilistic’ in the sense that one only distinguishes between
possible outcomes (positive probability) and impossible outcomes (zero probability). Here we show
that Hardy’s paradox is quite universal: in any (2, 2, l) or (2, k, 2) Bell scenario, the occurence of
Hardy’s paradox is a necessary and sufficient condition for possibilistic non-locality. In particular,
it subsumes all ladder paradoxes. This universality of Hardy’s paradox is not true more generally:
we find a new ‘proof without inequalities’ in the (2, 3, 3) scenario that can witness non-locality even
for correlations that do not display the Hardy paradox. We discuss the ramifications of our results
for the computational complexity of recognising possibilistic non-locality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the fundamental insight of Bell [3][4], it is known
that quantum mechanics cannot be completed to a local
realistic theory. This is usually demonstrated by consid-
ering spatially separated systems on which certain ob-
servables can be measured. Joint measurements across
the systems give rise to joint probability distributions for
each global choice of observables. Under the assumptions
of locality and realism, it can be shown that these cor-
relations need to satisfy certain Bell inequalities which
can be violated quantum-mechanically, from which Bell’s
conclusion follows. Inferring that certain correlations are
incompatible with local realism is a non-locality proof.
A more intuitive approach to non-locality proofs has
been pioneered by Greenberger, Horne, Shimony and
Zeilinger [11][10] as well as Hardy [12]. This kind of
non-locality proof — we will explain Hardy’s ‘paradox’
in section II — disregards the exact values of the joint
outcome probabilities and only records which of them
are non-zero and which are zero. In other words, one
distinguishes only between possible outcomes and impos-
sible outcomes, and this turns out to be sufficient for
separating quantum mechanics from local realism. Sub-
sequently, several other non-locality ‘paradoxes’ of this
type have been found [5][8][7].
In this paper, we follow Abramsky [1] in considering
a general framework for such possibilistic non-locality
proofs. More specifically, we study possibilistic Bell in-
equalities in (n, k, l) Bell scenarios, where n is the num-
ber of sites, k is the number of allowed measurements at
each site, and l is the number of possible outcomes for
each measurement. In this paper, we will only be con-
cerned with scenarios for which n = 2. What we find is a
remarkable universality of Hardy’s paradox: it is a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for possibilistic non-locality
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in all (2, k, 2) and (2, 2, l) scenarios. However, for the
(2, 3, 3) scenario we find a new possibilistic locality con-
dition which can be violated without the occurence of a
Hardy paradox.
II. HARDY’S NON-LOCALITY PARADOX
The original Hardy paradox concerns the (2, 2, 2) sce-
nario [12]. Let us begin by considering this example. To
make it more concrete, let’s say that the two sites are
Alice’s lab and Bob’s lab, which share a (possibly en-
tangled) quantum state. Each experimenter can choose
to make one of two measurements on their subsystem,
which we call polarisation and colour. Each measure-
ment has two possible outcomes: {↑, ↓} for polarisation,
and {R,G} for colour. We assume that Alice and Bob
perform very many runs of the experiment (each time
starting with the same shared state) and then tabulate
their results as in table I. A ‘1’ in the table signifies that
it was possible to obtain those two outcomes in the same
run, and a ‘0’ signifies that this never happened. Fol-
lowing [1], we use the term empirical model for such a
specification of possibilities. In general, any probabilistic
empirical model can be transformed into a possibilistic
one in a canonical way via possibilistic collapse: the pro-
cess by which all non-zero probabilities are conflated to
1.
This partially completed table is Hardy’s paradox.
The apparent paradox arises because the table tells us
that, when both experimenters measured polarisation, it
was possible for them to both get the outcome ↑; but,
when one measured polarisation and the other measured
colour, it never happened that they could obtain ↑ and
G together. From these statements it seems that when-
ever ↑ was measured in one lab, the colour in the other
lab must have had the value R; and since it was possi-
ble for both to get the outcome ↑, then it should have
been possible for both to get the outcome R if the exper-
imenters had instead decided to measure colour on those
2TABLE I. Empirical model of the Hardy paradox. This is
a possibilistic table with ‘1’ standing for ‘possible’ and ‘0’
standing for ‘impossible’. The blank entries are unspecified
and can be either 0 or 1.
Bob
Alice
↑ ↓ R G
↑ 1 0
↓
R 0
G 0
runs. However, the remaining specified entry in the table
tells us that it was not possible for both experimenters
to measure R. Despite this apparent paradox, such be-
haviour is actually predicted by quantum mechanics.
Of course, in stating this argument, we have made
some implicit assumptions. In particular, we have as-
sumed locality (or, to be more precise, no-signalling) in
that we assume that, for each run, Bob’s choice of mea-
surement did not affect Alice’s outcome and vice versa.
Such behaviour could give rise to faster-than-light com-
munication between far distant labs, which is prohibited
by special relativity. We have also implicitly assumed
realism: that colour and polarisation had definite values
even when they were not being measured. A further as-
sumption is that every combined measurement choice has
some outcome. This is equivalent to Abramsky’s prop-
erty of measurement locality [1].
We can write the condition for non-occurence of the
Hardy paradox in table I as a formula in Boolean logic:
p(↑, ↑) → p(↑, G) ∨ p(G, ↑) ∨ p(R,R) ,
where the p(i, j) ∈ {0, 1} are the entries of the table, or
the possibility values for Alice to obtain outcome i and
Bob to obtain outcome j.
For the (2, 2, 2) scenario, there are 64 versions of the
Hardy paradox which one obtains from table I by permut-
ing measurements and/or outcomes. We will continue to
use the term paradox throughout this paper, though we
draw attention to the fact that this is only an apparent
paradox. What the ‘paradox’ states is that models of a
certain form cannot satisfy the properties of locality and
realism.
III. PROPERTIES OF EMPIRICAL MODELS
In any discussion of locality, realism, etc. it is impor-
tant to be careful about which properties are being as-
sumed or inferred. A detailed discussion of the properties
of possibilistic empirical models is contained in [1]; and
the properties of probabilistic empirical models are dis-
cussed in [6]. We will now present some of these proper-
ties in the context of our tabular representation of n = 2
TABLE II. Examples of possibilistic empirical models. (a) A
deterministic empirical model; (b) a local realistic model; (c)
a signalling model.
↑ ↓ R G
↑ 1 0 1 0
↓ 0 0 0 0
R 1 0 1 0
G 0 0 0 0
↑ ↓ R G
↑ 1 0 1 0
↓ 1 0 0 1
R 1 0 1 0
G 1 0 0 1
↑ ↓ R G
↑ 1 0 1 0
↓ 0 0 0 0
R 0 1 1 0
G 0 0 0 0
(a) (b) (c)
empirical models.
We assume from the outset that all the models we
deal with satisfy measurement locality (ML): the prop-
erty that at each site the allowed measurements are in-
dependent of which measurements are made at the other
sites. For n = 2, this is equivalent to the property that
if the table of a model has any zero box then that box
must belong to a row (or column) of zero boxes. This
allows us to omit such rows/columns of zero boxes in the
tabular representation and to assume that all tables are
totally defined on the domain of measurement choices.
(Possibilistic) No-signalling (NS) is the property that
the choice of measurement at one site does not affect the
possible outcomes at another site. In terms of the tabu-
lar representation, this means that if a sub-row has any
1 then that sub-row must have a 1 in each box, and sim-
ilarly for sub-columns. For example, table II (a) and (b)
are both no-signalling, while (c) is signalling. In (c), if
Alice measures polarisation, then the outcome of a po-
larisation measurement by Bob has to be ↑, but if Al-
ice measures colour then Bob always gets ↓. It can be
shown that if an empirical model violates possibilistic no-
signalling then it also violates probabilistic no-signalling.
The converse does not hold in general [1].
(Strong) Determinism is the property that the out-
come at each site is uniquely determined by the mea-
surement at that site. In the tabular form, this property
says that each box should contain at most one 1, and that
the 1s are consistent with no-signalling in that they line
up in the same sub-rows/columns where possible. We
call such an arrangement of 1s a deterministic grid. Ta-
ble II (a) is an example of a deterministic model. By this
definition, determinism implies no-signalling.
In order to define local realistic models, we need a no-
tion of stochastic mixtures in our possibilistic setting.
We define the mixture of a model A with entries pAij and
a model B with entries pBij to be the model with entries
pij ≡ p
A
ij ∨ p
B
ij ,
which corresponds to the intuition that an outcome is
possible in the mixture if and only if it is possible in at
least one component of the mixture.
The local realistic models are the models that can be
obtained by taking arbitrary mixtures of deterministic
3models. In the tabular representation, a model is local
realistic if and only if every 1 in its table belongs to some
deterministic grid. An example of a local realistic model
is table II (b). In fact, these are precisely the empirical
models that can be described with local hidden variables.
The choice of the hidden variable corresponds to saying
which deterministic model we’re in.
We then obtain the following proposition, which facil-
itates the application of our results to the usual proba-
bilistic setting:
Proposition 1. With these definitions, possibilistic col-
lapse takes probabilistic local realistic models to possibilis-
tic local realistic models. Conversely, every possibilistic
local realistic model can be written as the possibilistic col-
lapse of a probabilistic one.
Proof. The first statement is clear from the fact that
a non-trivial convex combination of two probabilities
pA, pB ∈ [0, 1] is non-zero precisely when at least one
of pA or pB is non-zero. For the second statement, we
simply write a given possibilistic local realistic model as a
mixture of deterministic models and assign an arbitrary
non-zero probability to each of these models such that
the probabilities sum to 1. This defines a probabilistic
local realistic model with the required property.
We interpret this as saying that a non-locality proof
without inequalities exists for given correlations if and
only if their possibilistic collapse is not local realistic in
our possibilistic sense.
IV. COARSE-GRAINED VERSIONS OF
HARDY’S PARADOX
For (2, 2, l) scenarios, we consider coarse-grainings of
the Hardy paradox. The basic form is the same as in the
(2, 2, 2) case (table I), but in the general case (table III)
we have m1×m2, (l−m1)× 1 and 1× (l−m2) subtables
of 0s, where 0 < m2,m1 < l. Any empirical model whose
table is isomorphic (up to permutations of measurements
and outcomes) to table III for some particular m1, m2
is said to have a coarse-grained Hardy paradox. We use
the notation H(m1,m2) for this property. Conditions for
the non-occurrence of a paradox can still be written as a
logical formula. For table III the corresponding formula
is
p(o′1, o
′
1)→
l∨
r=m1+1
p(or, o
′
1) ∨
l∨
s=m2+1
p(o′1, os) ∨
∨
r∈[1,m1]
s∈[1,m2]
p(or, os) .
We use the notation NH(m1,m2) for the property that all
such formulae are satisfied for a particular model.
The coarse-graining includes the degenerate values 0
and l for m1 and m2. The cases m1 = 0, m2 = l and
m1 = l, m2 = 0 are especially interesting. For table III,
TABLE III. A (2, 2, l) scenario with aH(m1,m2) coarse-grained
Hardy paradox.
o′1 · · · o
′
l o1 · · · om2 om2+1 · · · ol
o′1 1 0 · · · 0
...
o′l
o1
...
om1
0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0
om1+1
...
ol
0
...
0
these state that the first sub-column in the lower left box
needs to contain some 1, and, respectively, that the first
sub-row in the upper right box needs to contain some
1. These are the possibilistic no-signalling relations! By
permutations of measurements and outcomes, these ap-
ply to any 1 in the table; so for the no-signalling predicate
we get
NS = NH(0,l) ∧NH(l,0) .
The case wherem1 = m2 = l simply expresses that the
lower right box in table III should contain at least some
1. This is the normalisation of possibility: at least one
outcome has to be possible for each choice of measure-
ments. So given that at least some 1 occurs somewhere
in the table of a no-signalling model, the normalisation
of possibility is equivalent to NH(l,l).
These properties and observations extend to all (2, k, l)
Bell scenarios by considering 2× 2 subtables.
V. UNIVERSALITY OF HARDY’S PARADOX
We now write NH for the property that no coarse-
grained Hardy paradox occurs.
Proposition 2. For the (2, 2, 2) scenario, the property
of non-occurrence of any coarse-grained paradox is equiv-
alent to possibilistic local realism:
NH ↔ (Local Realism) . (1)
Proof. We have already demonstrated in section II that
an occurence of the Hardy paradox implies a violation of
local realism. It only remains to prove that NH implies
local realism. By the observations at the end of the last
section, we know in particular that NH implies NS, so
that we can freely use the latter.
4TABLE IV. Stages in the proof of proposition 2.
1 1 1
1 *
1 1 *
1 0 1
* 1
(a) (b) (c)
From the earlier definition, a model is local realistic
if and only if every 1 in its tabular representation be-
longs to some deterministic grid. We begin by choosing
an arbitrary 1 in the table. Without loss of generality
(w.l.o.g.) let this be the 1 in table IV (a). Then, by NS,
the first sub-row must have a 1 in each box, and similarly
for the first sub-column. Again w.l.o.g. we let these be
the entries in table IV (b). If the starred entry here is
a 1, this completes the first entry to a deterministic grid
and we’re done. Assume that the starred entry is a 0.
Then, by no-signalling, we can fill in the 1s in the lower
right box of table IV (c). Now, if either of the starred
entries in this table is a 1 then this completes the first
entry to a deterministic grid. This must be the case, for
if it were not then the 0s in these places would form a
Hardy paradox together with the first entry and the 0 in
the lower right box; but we have assumed the property
NH .
This proposition generalises easily to (2, 2, l) scenarios.
Proposition 3. For (2, 2, l) scenarios, the property of
non-occurrence of any coarse-grained Hardy paradox is
equivalent to local realism; i.e. (1) holds for (2, 2, l) sce-
narios.
Proof. Again, it is enough to show that the left-hand side
implies the right-hand side while assuming NS. If we
take an arbitrary 1 in the table, then w.l.o.g. we can
represent the model as in table V by permuting measure-
ments and outcomes if necessary. Assuming that there
is no coarse-grained paradox, at least one of the starred
entries must be a 1, and this completes the arbitrarily
chosen 1 to a deterministic rectangle.
We can also generalise proposition 2 to (2, k, 2) scenar-
ios.
Proposition 4. For (2, k, 2) scenarios, the property of
non-occurrence of any Hardy paradox is equivalent to lo-
cal realism; i.e. (1) holds for (2, k, 2) scenarios.
Proof. By proposition 2, we know that this holds for k =
2, and will show by induction that it holds for all k. It is
useful to use the tabular representation of models in what
follows. In this setting, it has to be shown that every 1
in a given table can be completed to a deterministic grid
of 1s, assuming that no Hardy paradox occurs. We will
TABLE V. Taking an arbitrary 1 (upper left) in the table of
a no-signalling model forces the table to be of this form.
1 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0
1
...
1
∗ · · · ∗
...
. . .
...
∗ · · · ∗
0
...
0
show that this property holds for all k1 × k2 tables, i.e.
for all scenarios with k1 two-outcome measurements for
Alice and k2 two-outcome measurements for Bob, given
that it holds for all k1×(k2−1) tables and all (k1−1)×k2
tables.
Firstly, we prove the inductive step in the case where
some sub-row or sub-column in the k1×k2 table consists
entirely of 0s. Say we have an outcome sub-column of 0s
for some measurement setting of Bob. Then we pick any
1 in the table. If this 1 is in the same measurement set-
ting of Bob as the sub-column of 0s, then by no-signalling
its sub-row has a 1 in each box of the same setting for
Alice. We choose any other of these 1s, complete it to
a deterministic grid in the k1 × (k2 − 1) table obtained
by ignoring the particular setting of Bob. Then, by no-
signalling, this must complete to a k1 × k2 deterministic
grid. If the initial 1 is in a different measurement setting
of Bob to the column of 0s, one can similarly forget the
latter setting and apply the induction assumption to the
remaining k1× (k2− 1) table. Again, the resulting deter-
ministic grid in the sub-table completes uniquely to the
whole table by no-signalling. A similar argument holds
for sub-rows of 0s.
Now we need to prove the inductive step in the case
where there are no sub-rows or sub-columns of 0s. By no-
signalling, this is equivalent to no individual box having
a sub-row/column of 0s. Hence we can assume that every
box has a diagonal or anti-diagonal of 1s. We choose an
arbitrary 1 in the table, which w.l.o.g. we can write in
the upper left corner. By the inductive hypothesis, this
can be completed to a k1 × (k2 − 1) deterministic grid,
which w.l.o.g. we write in the upper left corners of all
boxes up to Bob’s (k2 − 1)th setting (see table VI).
Assume that this deterministic grid does not complete
to Bob’s k2th setting. Then there must be a 0 in the
upper right corner of some box(es) of Bob’s k2th setting,
and a 0 in the upper left corner of some box(es) in the
same setting. In table VI, we have illustrated a represen-
tative situation, including the diagonals or anti-diagonals
that these boxes must have. In order to avoid a Hardy
5TABLE VI. Table for the proof of proposition 4.
1
· · ·
1 1 0
1
1
*
· · ·
1
*
0 1
1
1
· · ·
1
. . .
TABLE VII. A ladder paradox. The (2, 2, 2) ladder paradox
is just the standard Hardy paradox.
1 0
0
* . . .
. . . 0
0
0
paradox triggered by the 1s in the top sub-row, we must
have 1s in the starred places, corresponding to all those
sub-rows where the 0 in the k2th setting of Bob occurs on
the upper left. But now we can find a deterministic grid
including the initial 1 for table VI by choosing the second
outcome for Alice in the case of a starred row and the
first outcome otherwise, while choosing the first outcome
for Bob in all measurements.
Hardy’s ladder paradox [5] has been proposed as a gen-
eralisation of Hardy’s original paradox and was used for
experimental tests of quantum non-locality [2]. Up to
symmetries, there is one ladder paradox for any number
of settings k. It can be presented neatly in tabular form
(table VII).
We will not explain here how the ladder paradox is
in contradiction with local realism, as our proposition 4
makes it clear that the ladder paradox has to be sub-
sumed by the original Hardy paradox in terms of its
strength for proving non-locality. In fact, one can also
see this directly: if the starred entry in table VII is a
0, then the Hardy paradox occurs; if it is a 1, then the
ladder paradox for k − 1 settings gets triggered by this
1. Applying the argument recursively, we find that ei-
ther the Hardy paradox occurs somewhere in the table,
or the ladder paradox for 2 settings occurs. Since the
latter is again just the original Hardy paradox, we find
TABLE VIII. (a) A non-locality proof without inequalities;
(b) a probabilistic no-signalling model to which it applies al-
though it displays no (coarse-grained) Hardy paradox.
1 0
0
0
0
0
1
16
3
16 0
1
8
1
8
3
16
9
16
1
2
1
8
1
8
0 12
1
8
1
4
1
8
1
4
1
4
3
8 0
1
8
0 12
1
8
1
8
1
4
1
4
1
4
3
8
1
8 0
(a) (b)
that Hardy’s paradox occurs in any case. Hence the oc-
curence of a ladder paradox always implies the occurence
of the original Hardy paradox.
Proposition 5. For (2, k, 2) scenarios, the occurrence
of a ladder paradox implies the occurrence of a Hardy
paradox.
VI. NON-UNIVERSALITY OF HARDY’S
PARADOX
The results of the previous section might raise the
conjecture that the Hardy paradox could be universal
in the same sense for any (2, k, l) scenario. However,
we have found that the equivalence of local realism to
the absence of Hardy-type non-locality does not hold for
(2, k, l) scenarios in general: consider the probabilistic
empirical model displayed in table VIII (b), for exam-
ple. It concerns a Bell scenario with three two-outcome
measurements for Alice; and one two-outcome and one
three-outcome measurement for Bob. (This can easily
be expanded to a probabilistic empirical model in the
(2, 3, 3) scenario, but we find the example easier to un-
derstand in the form of table VIII.) By direct inspection,
we find that no coarse-grained Hardy paradox occurs for
this empirical model. Nevertheless, it displays possibilis-
tic (and hence probabilistic) non-locality: the 1 in the
upper left corner of table VIII (a) cannot be completed
to a determnistic grid.
In conclusion, the Hardy paradox and its coarse-
grainings cannot account for all non-local realistic be-
haviour in scenarios with at least three settings and at
least three outcomes. In general, the non-occurrence of
a Hardy paradox is necessary but not sufficient for pos-
sibilistic local realism.
VII. DISCUSSION
We have shown Hardy’s non-locality paradox to be rel-
atively universal in terms of non-local or non-realistic
6behaviour. It is the only non-locality proof without in-
equalities for (2, 2, l) and (2, k, 2) Bell scenarios, in the
sense that it is a necessary and sufficient condition for
possibilistic non-locality. We can even interpret the pos-
sibilistic versions of the no-signalling condition and the
normalisation of probabilities as degenerate cases of the
non-occurence of a coarse-grained Hardy paradox. More-
over, we have found that this universality does not extend
to the (2, 3, 3) possibilistic Bell scenario.
This raises the question of finding other possibilistic
non-locality conditions that do not belong to the class
of Hardy paradoxes for k, l ≥ 3. It is pertinent to ask
whether such non-locality (for example empirical models
of the kind of table VIII) can be realised in quantum me-
chanics. It has been demonstrated by one of the authors
[9] that some variants of Hardy-type non-locality that
can be realised by Popescu-Rorhlich no-signalling boxes
[14] cannot be realised in quantum mechanics. It also
remains to be seen how the ideas presented in this paper
extend to scenarios with n > 2, where a two-dimensional
tabular representation can no longer be used. The GHZ
argument concerns the (3, 2, 2) scenario [11]; does this
rely on an abstraction of Hardy type non-locality?
Finally, the results presented here tell us something
about the computational complexity of recognising pos-
siblistic non-locality in certain scenarios, where doing the
latter is equivalent to deciding whether a (coarse-grained)
Hardy paradox occurs. For (2, k, 2) scenarios, this sim-
ply amounts to checking all 2 × 2 sub-tables for such
a paradox, which gives an algorithm that is polynomial
in the size of the input. For (2, 2, l) scenarios, one has
to check whether each 1 in the table can be completed
to a deterministic grid; so, following the illustration in
table V, it is to be checked whether there is some 1
among the starred entries, which is equivalent to the non-
occurence of the coarse-grained Hardy paradox. Again,
this is clearly polynomial in the size of the input.
So for (2, 2, l) and (2, k, 2) scenarios, polynomial al-
gorithms can be given. The general case with varying k
and l remains an open problem. Our results of section VI
and work by Zavodny [15] lead us to conjecture that this
general decidability problem for possibilistic local realist
models is NP-hard; as is the case for probabilistic mod-
els [13]. This gives reason to suspect that it may not be
possible to obtain a classification of conditions that are
necessary and sufficient for possibilistic local realism in
full generality.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
SM would like to thank Samson Abramsky and Rui
Barbosa for valuable discussions. TF is supported by
the EU STREP QCS.
[1] Samson Abramsky. Relational hidden variables and non-
locality. arXiv ePrints, Jul 2010.
[2] M. Barbieri, C. Cinelli, F. De Martini, and P. Mataloni.
Test of quantum nonlocality by full collection of polar-
ization entangled photon pairs. The European Physi-
cal Journal D-Atomic, Molecular, Optical and Plasma
Physics, 32(2):261–267, 2005.
[3] John S. Bell. On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox.
Physics, 1:195–200, 1964.
[4] John S. Bell. Speakable and unspeakable in quantum me-
chanics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987.
Collected papers on quantum philosophy.
[5] D. Boschi, S. Branca, F. De Martini, and L. Hardy. Lad-
der proof of nonlocality without inequalities: Theoret-
ical and experimental results. Physical review letters,
79(15):2755–2758, 1997.
[6] A. Brandenburger and N. Yanofsky. A classification of
hidden-variable properties. Journal of Physics A: Math-
ematical and Theoretical, 41:425302, 2008.
[7] Jose´ L. Cereceda. Hardy’s nonlocality for generalized n-
particle GHZ states. Physics Letters A, 327(5-6):433 –
437, 2004.
[8] S. K. Choudhary, S. Ghosh, G. Kar, S. Kunkri, R. Ra-
haman, and A. Roy. Hardy’s non-locality and generalized
non-local theory. ArXiv ePrints, July 2008.
[9] Tobias Fritz. Quantum analogues of Hardy’s nonlocality
paradox. arXiv ePrints, Jun 2010.
[10] D. M. Greenberger, M. A. Horne, A. Shimony, and
A. Zeilinger. Bell’s theorem without inequalities. Amer-
ican Journal of Physics, 58:1131, 1990.
[11] Daniel M. Greenberger, Michael A. Horne, and Anton
Zeilinger. Going Beyond Bell’s Theorem. In M. Kafatos,
editor, Bell’s Theorem, Quantum Theory, and Concep-
tions of the Universe, pages 69–72. Kluwer, 1989.
[12] L. Hardy. Nonlocality for two particles without inequali-
ties for almost all entangled states. Physical Review Let-
ters, 71(11):1665–1668, 1993.
[13] I. Pitowsky. Correlation polytopes: their geometry and
complexity. Mathematical Programming, 50(1):395–414,
1991.
[14] S. Popescu and D. Rohrlich. Quantum nonlocality as an
axiom. Foundations of Physics, 24(3):379–385, 1994.
[15] Jakub Zavodny. In preparation.
